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Dear Reader,
The Center to Advance Racial Equity (CARE) is pleased to present Economic Equity in Communities of Color: The
Effectiveness of Minority Contracting Initiatives. At the request of the Coalition of Black Men, CARE was asked to
provide research support to study the status of minority contracting and dig into relevant data to see how well the
system is working. Beginning with the hiring of researcher Matt Chorpenning (MSW) and extending to include
support from Dr. Greg Schrock and a student researcher Nathen Lamb from the Toulan School of Urban Studies
and Planning at Portland State University, this team of three were headed by Dr. Ann Curry-Stevens. All four
worked in deep partnership with James Posey from the Coalition of Black Men to provide for you this report.
The goal of this report was originally to examine minority contracting by governments in the state of Oregon, but
that discussion quickly grew to exist within a broader context of wage gaps for workers of color and the difficulty
of obtaining clear data on workforce diversity. Essentially, our process has led us to discern the degree to which
current contracting policies within various levels of government in Oregon are actually resulting in greater
economic opportunities for communities of color. Our results, as the reader will see, are mixed, and have yet to be
developed as the effective lever that minority contracting policies hold the potential to deliver.
The case study of the Sellwood Bridge Project, conducted by Dr. Greg Schrock and Nathen Lamb, highlights these
issues and the results can most charitably be described as mixed. While some diversity goals of the project have
been met, a closer examination of the data reveals a significant wage gap between white workers and workers of
color. Further, the gap is largely attributable to the fact that workers of color are concentrated in the lowest-paid
jobs on the project. Such findings are troubling as the net impact of this public investment results in a likely
expansion to the economic gap between workers of color and white workers, who continue to reap the most from
the project.
Significant recommendations are included at the close of the report. We remain positive about the potential of
numerous avenues to support minority contracting but signal that these levers are not being maximized, to the
detriment of workers and communities of color.
Whether you are an elected official, or a policy maker, or someone interested in how to support racial equity,
please do read the report. We believe it provides concrete advice for improvements to minority contracting
policies, practices and accountability systems.
Created in 2012 to provide needed resources for community groups engaged in racial equity efforts, the Center to
Advance Racial Equity (CARE) has been linking researchers to community groups so as to better articulate needs
and solutions that hold potential to advance racial equity. CARE has been publishing studies tied to a variety of
local issues such as culturally responsive programing, effective data systems to document disparities, youth gang
violence, culturally relevant food security, educational equity, environmental funding to communities of color, and
oral health issues within the Asian and Pacific Islander community. We are pleased to add this study, Economic
Equity in Communities of Color: The Effectiveness of Minority Contracting, to CARE’s publications.
Matt Chorpenning, Ann Curry-Stevens, Greg Schrock, and Nathen Lamb
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Executive Summary
There is a growing body of work that documents the positive impact that government contracting to
minority-owned businesses can have on communities of color. As an exemplar, the State of Maryland reports
that in 2011, their $1 billion worth of contracts to state-certified Minority and/or Woman-owned Businesses
Enterprises (MWBEs) amounted to 12,830 full-time jobs, $392 million in wages and salaries and $25.5 million
in state and local tax receipts (Lohrentz et al, 2014).
As government contracting has become more prevalent, it has come to be seen as a possible method by
which states, counties and cities can address racial disparities (Shaw, 2010; Enchautegui et al, 1997). The
purpose of this report is to explore the efficacy of contracting to minority-owned businesses and the extent
to which money awarded to minority-owned businesses makes its way into communities of color through the
hiring of workers of color.
This report also unveils, for the first time, details on minority contracting in the State of Oregon. The State of
Oregon awarded nearly $2 billion in contracts in 2013 to all contractors. The State had the explicit goal of
directing 10% of that money to minority-owned or woman-owned businesses as a means of providing
economic opportunity to populations who typically experience systemic barriers. Oregon fell well short of its
goal (barely 1% of funds distributed were awarded to women-owned or minority-owned businesses) and yet
2013 marked the first year that minority-owned and woman-owned businesses received more than 1% of
contract dollars. Viewing these weak results in comparison with the progress that has been emerging in
Multnomah County, Metro and the City of Portland, we encourage the State to seriously and immediately
address the status of minority contracting in its department.
Our examination of the Sellwood Bridge project reveals both the progress made toward racial equity in
contracting and the distance yet to travel. As per project goals, workers of color do make up 20% of the
workforce on the project, and actually hold almost half of such positions. However, they are mostly grouped
in the lowest-paying jobs on the project, with no clear path for career advancement. White workers make
almost five dollars per hour more on the Sellwood Bridge project than all workers of color combined; when
we compare African Americans to White workers, the gap doubles. Furthermore, minority-owned businesses
receive much smaller subcontracts than mainstream firms on the project, despite evidence that minorityowned businesses tend to hire more diverse workforces.
A survey of relevant literature reveals several features of effective, accountable minority contracting
programs, among them:
• Clear, accessible data that the public can view in real time (Jaja, 2013)
• Stiff penalties for fraud (Bates and Williams, 1995)
• Clear program goals, including long-term aspirations that can be reflected in bids from potential
contractors (Jaja, 2013; Flynn, 2014; Lohrentz et al, 2014)
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•

State assistance in the certification process so minority-owned businesses can navigate the often
cumbersome steps to being certified as a Minority/Woman-Owned/Emerging Small Business or
MWESB (Bates and Williams, 1995; Lorhrentz et al, 2014)

The recommendations put forth here are rooted in our case study of the Sellwood Bridge and a growing body
of research in the area of minority contracting by government entities. Our central recommendation is that
governments prioritize the creation of a regional system that ensures that minority contracting is as effective
as possible. We must ensure that we generate real economic gains for minority owned businesses, for
workers of color, and for their local communities where children are raised. The second theme in our findings
is the imperative to ensure that policies are translated into effective performance measures. Too many
policies are ineffective because of the absence of accountability practices. Third, we must collect clear data
to support the achievement of diversity goals on contracted projects and that the data collected be made
accessible in real time, so the public can see and evaluate for themselves whether or not their tax dollars are
promoting equity and economic opportunity for communities of color.
The central recommendation is to implement a regional strategy to provide improved opportunities for
minority contractors (Lohrentz et al, 2014). This strategy should ideally:
1. Require active participation of all departments and agencies
2. Include clear goals and benchmarks
3. Provide assistance in navigating the MWESB certification process
4. Develop and employ standardized methods of data collection and reporting that are clear,
accountable, and accessible to the public in real time
Four additional categories of recommendations are included in this report: (1) accountability and data
systems, (2) innovations, (3) incentives and sanctions, and (4) discourse and awareness efforts. The need for
readily available and accurate data accompanied by clear goals in minority contracting cannot be overstated;
in an audit of Metro's MWESB program, Flynn (2014) found that Metro staff were not always clear on the
goals of the program and that annual reports were publishing data from the wrong fiscal year. Since annual
reports tend to be the method by which interested citizens obtain information about such programs, unclear
data can lead to unclear results and a skewed picture of what is really happening.
We retain a goal for all levels of government to dig comprehensively into its progress on minority
contracting. We want to ensure that taxpayer money for public construction has a long reach into
communities of color. This would lead to diversity for the sake of equity as opposed to diversity for the sake
of diversity. To move effectively forward, we urge real partnerships with community advocates, including
those who have been on the receiving end of inequities of such contracting practices.
There is clear intention within the Portland metropolitan area and Multnomah County to address issues of
racial equity; our hope with this report is that steps are taken to move from intention to measurable results.
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Introduction
As the movement for racial equity takes hold in Portland, Oregon, we look for examples of where the living
conditions of communities of color are improving. One concrete initiative that many point to is the
“protected contracting” initiatives that are entrenched in both policy and practice at most levels of
government. It is laudable that our governments have committed themselves to ensuring that the businesses
owned by persons of color (called “minority owned businesses”) have an increasing slice of public dollars that
are spent on various contracts and subcontracts.
Before, however, we become celebrate this commitment, we wanted to make sure that the promised results
were actually occurring. In research conducted for a 2010 report on racial disparities in the region, three
findings raised concerns. The first was the obscuring of results for business owners of color when
government data reports amalgamated minority-owned businesses with women-owned businesses and
emerging small businesses. When we were able to disaggregate these reports, it was clear that few dollars
were going to businesses of color. The second was that there were few minority-owned businesses in Oregon
and that it appeared that fewer still were gaining certification to become eligible for “protected contracting”
initiatives. The third was that few dollars made it into the “protected contracting” arena, and the vast
majority of contracts continue to be awarded to white-owned businesses.
These 2010 findings needed some updating, as recent reports have been released on the status of minority
contracts in the city, the county, metro and the state. We share these findings in this report. We also share
our assessment of the effectiveness of data reports to document the equity that exists in government
contracting practices. The bottom line? Many improvements are still needed.
Also on our radar are major public works projects, including the Sellwood Bridge project that has marked the
largest local public expenditure in recent years. This report digs into the available data and we explore how
well the objective of 20% to go into protected contracting, and 20% of the project’s hours to be worked by
people of color. Our findings are that these goals have not been fully reached. We also expand our analysis of
the Sellwood Bridge records to examine the profile of workers of color on the project, their average pay level,
the types of employment secured, and the degree of investment that these workforce numbers create for
our various communities in the region. All remain troubling.
And yet, we are far from ready to suggest these initiatives are not successful. This report also details the
results of our literature review on the topic, and the types of improvements that could be made to our local
contracting practices so as to ensure improved results.
We conclude this report with concrete recommendations for data systems, contracting practices, and
transparency of progress, alongside ways to handle shortfalls in meeting objectives.
We very much look forward to ongoing dialogue with public officials responsible for these initiatives, and
hope to ensure that in the next five years, gains can be made to the ways that public dollars are invested.
Racial equity, narrowing the gap between workers of color and white workers, and improving the role of
businesses of color so as to help expand the wellbeing of communities of color are our goals. We seek the
support of public leaders to act on our recommendations and use public contracting to expand racial equity.
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Minority Contracting Policy History
Summary of the Status of Minority Contracting
Government efforts to increase contracting to minority-owned businesses can be traced back at least as far
as the Nixon Administration. In 1969, Richard Nixon signed Executive Order 11458, which gave the Secretary
of Commerce authority to “Coordinate as consistent with law the plans, programs, and operations of the
Federal Government which affect or may contribute to the establishment, preservation and strengthening of
minority business enterprise” (para 3). The order also established the Minority Business Development Agency
(Rice, 1991). When the Supreme Court ruled, in Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980), that government set-aside
programs were a valid method for Congress to use in order to combat past discrimination, such programs
“proliferated nationwide to include some 36 states and 190 localities by the late 1980s” (Rice, 1991, p.114).
However, two later Supreme Court rulings had a tremendous dampening effect on government contracting
policy in the United States. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (1989), the Court ruled that state and local
set-aside programs (those that were intended to address inequity by requiring a certain amount of contract
dollars be set aside for minority business enterprises) could only be allowed to exist if they satisfied two
requirements of “strict scrutiny.” First, they must be “justified by compelling governmental interest” and
second, they must be “narrowly tailored to accomplish a remedial purpose” (p.1). In 1995, the Court, in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, applied the same strict scrutiny standard to all federal set-aside
programs. Enchautegui et al (1997) sum up the impact of these rulings: “Proponents of race-based policies
intended to help minorities must meet the same high standard of proof required for proponents of racebased practices that disadvantage minorities” (p.ix). It is perhaps unsurprising then that Enchautegui et al
found in their 1997 national study that “minority-owned businesses receive far fewer government contract
dollars than would be expected based on their availability” in a post-Croson America (p.x). Riccucci (2007)
found that “the concept of strict scrutiny has been applied in an inconsistent, arbitrary manner and,
therefore, should not serve as the basis for judicial review of affirmative action programs” (p.124).
Following Croson and Adarand, a burden of proof has been placed upon governments, state or local, to
establish a history of discrimination before enacting a remedy such as a set-aside program. This proof has
typically been supplied in the form of disparity studies which have varied widely in cost and rigor. Rice (1992)
found, however, that carefully conducted disparity studies “may assist state and local entities in devising
MBE set-aside programs that will expand minority access to government contracts” (p.489).
Enchautegui et al (1997) wrote that, “Procurement – like public employment – provides governments with a
potentially powerful tool for promoting minority opportunities and counteracting discrimination” (p.vii). Our
concern here is to gain an understanding of how effectively this tool is being used in Oregon, with a specific
focus on contracts awarded by the state, Multnomah County, the City of Portland, and Metro.
In their 2010 report, Communities of Color in Multnomah County: An Unsettling Profile, Curry-Stevens et al
noted that only 7% of all of Oregon's licensed businesses were owned by people of color. New data is
expected to be released in 2015 when we will see if things have improved, but the Coalition report points out
that “while 20,677 minority-owned businesses operate in Oregon, only 3.3% of them are certified, and fewer
still are certified as 'minority-owned businesses' for procurement eligibility” (p.55). Because government
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contracting can be so lucrative and can bring with it opportunities for technical assistance, the ability of
minority-owned businesses to compete on a level playing field for contracts is essential to addressing racial
equity and creating real economic opportunity for communities of color.
The 2010 Unsettling Profile report examined funding to minority-owned, women-owned, and emerging small
businesses (MWESB) from Multnomah County, Metro, and the City of Portland. The report found that, at all
three levels, minority-owned businesses were not receiving the amount of government contract dollars that
could be expected in a barrier-free environment. In fact, the data revealed that, within Portland's protected
contracting practices, “where there is an intention to increase the City's awards to communities of color,
White men gain the lion's share of these dollars, etching out 51% of the awards for their own businesses”
(p.54). The report found that, within the field of construction, minority-owned businesses in the city of
Portland received just $80,749 of $91 million in construction contracts from the city – just 0.088% of the total
money awarded from 2007 to 2008.
The 2010 Coalition report identified four priorities for improving contracting to minority-owned businesses:
• Better outreach and supports to expand certification practices
• Reporting on the equity achievements of Workforce Training and Hiring programs
• Affirmative action initiatives that ensure “removal of all employment barriers to full workforce
participation of people of color”
• The advancement of equity concerns in development agendas across all government levels (p.57)
The report also highlighted the need for changes to the macro context in which MWESBs are attempting to
thrive: “When people of color have few assets, are impoverished and face social exclusion and discrimination
on a regular basis, they are not likely to take risks and build their own businesses” (p.57). This conclusion
echoes the finding of Enchautegui et al (1997) more than a decade earlier, when they identified two types of
barriers faced by minority firms: “(1) barriers to firm formation and growth, and (2) barriers to participation
in the government contracting process itself” (p.viii).
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Current Status of Oregon, Multnomah County, Metro and the City of Portland
Because the 2010 Coalition of Communities of Color Report drew from governmental annual reports, it is
relatively simple for us to update the numbers for the County, City of Portland, and Metro and identify
trends. To establish a statewide context, we will begin with a look at the data reported by the Oregon House
Bill 2667 Task Force in September of 2014.

State of Oregon
As of June, 2014, the State of Oregon has 3,309 firms that are certified as MWESB firms (that is, minorityowned, women-owned and emerging small businesses). 1 Because updated data on all Oregon businesses will
not be available until 2015, we can only compare to the 2007 data used in the report by Curry et al (2010).
Table 1 shows a breakdown of Oregon's total number of licensed businesses with the most recent data
available to us. In the table below, we see that Oregon is well behind the USA averages for the presence of
communities of color in licensing their own firms.
Table 1. Oregon's Licensed Firms
2007

Oregon

USA

348,154

27,092,908

Black-owned firms

1.2%

7.1%

American Indian and Alaska Native-owned firms

1.2%

0.9%

Asian-owned firms

3.6%

5.7%

Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander-owned firms

0.2%

0.1%

Latino-owned firms

3.3%

8.3%

90.5%

77.9%

Total number of firms

White-owned firms
Source: Census Bureau’s Survey of Business Owners 2007. 2

In this same time period, the population of Oregon was 77.5% White, and in the USA was 62.2% White. This
translates into a greater racial disparity in Oregon: an Oregon resident of color more than two times less
likely to become a business owner than, on average, elsewhere in the nation, while a White Oregonian is only
half as likely as their national counterparts to own a business. This signals a magnitude of barriers to business
ownership that will partially be explained by differential wealth levels, for wealthier people who are much
more likely to be White are more likely to start businesses. Also implicated is access to credit, as people of
color are much less likely to be approved for credit, and are much more likely to not apply due to fear of
being turned down (Robb, 2013). 3
Coupled with these larger forces that deter and render many in communities of color unable to create
businesses, we also face challenges in accessing MWESB certification. The data below shows the Oregonwide data on the racial breakdown of these firms.
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Table 2. The racial breakdown of the certified D/MWESB firms in the state as of June, 2014.
Racial Identity, June 2014

%

Number of firms

African American/Black

6.3%

210

Asian and Pacific Islander

5.2%

171

White

70.9%

2347

Latino

8.7%

287

Native American

3.4%

114

Other

0.5%

15

Subcontinent Asian

2.0%

66

Unknown
3.0%
99
Source: Oregon’s State Legislature 2014 report on compliance with HB 2667 (p.9). 4

Excluding the categories of “Other” and “Unknown,” in order to keep the data as clear as possible, we see
that barely one quarter (25.62%, which is 848 businesses) of the certified MWESB firms in the entire state of
Oregon could be accurately described as minority-owned businesses. In fact, nearly 71% of certified MWESBs
are owned by white people, due to the overwhelming majority of this amalgam being awarded to “emerging
small businesses” which while facing challenges in becoming established, are almost completely owned by
white people, and mostly by white men. Disaggregated by gender, the 2,347 white MWESB owners break
down to 1,794 white men (54%) and 1,515 white women (46%). Put another way, more white men in Oregon
own certified MWESBs than all of the identified racial minorities combined.
Curry-Stevens et al pointed out that, as of 2010, “while 20,677 minority-owned businesses operate in
Oregon, only 3.3% of them are certified” (p.55). Using the 2014 data from the State of Oregon, we can see
that percentage has increased to 4.1%. Still, a staggering 95.9% of minority-owned businesses in our state are
not certified as MWESBs and therefore miss out on the opportunities provided through specialized
procurement programs. The HB 2667 Task Force (2014) lists several challenges to MWESB certification,
including a cumbersome application process, no guarantee of benefit, and payment delays that can be
especially problematic for smaller vendors (p.21).
As part of its 2013 Ten Year Plan for Oregon, the State set a goal that “State contracts with minority-owned
or woman-owned businesses meet or exceed 10% of the value of all agency contracts every year where
eligible firms exist” (quoted in Myers, 2013, p.3). The State separates minority and woman-owned businesses
into a discrete category apart from emerging small businesses but does not separate the two groups further.
This level of aggregation is still problematic (as it was for Curry-Stevens et al in 2010) but the State reports
awarding $25,802,073 of almost $2 billion to the combined minority and/or women-owned business
category. That amounts to 1.32% of contract dollars, 8.68% short of the stated goal. And yet, the state
reports that 2013 is “the first time since data has been collected” that contracting to minority-owned and/or
woman-owned businesses topped 1% of total funds (p.3). In the State's 2013 report, we see that minorities
and women have increased their share of state contracts from 0.78% ($19.8 million of $2.57 billion) of total
funds in 2010 to 1.32% in 2013. When this data is combined with the fact that more certified MWESBs in
Oregon are owned by white men than all identifiable minorities combined, it is logical to ask whether
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contracting to MWESBs is actually that much of a benefit for communities of color or if other steps might
need to be taken in order to increase economic opportunities for marginalized communities.
Table 3. State of Oregon Contracting to Minority and/or Women-owned businesses, 2009-2013.
Calendar
Year

Total Spend
Value

Minority &
Women Spend
Value

Minority &
Women %

Non Minority &
Women Spend %

Reporting
Agencies

Agencies with
Minority &
Women Spending

2009

$8,849,411,955

$4,798,452

0.05%

99.95%

11

9

2010

$2,566,371,942

$19,846,134

0.78%

99.22%

11

5

2011

$3,519,269,608

$33,017,961

0.92%

99.08%

12

12

2012

$2,523,496,452

$11,180,702

0.44%

99.56%

21

15

2013

$1,957,796,353

$25,802,073

1.32%

98.68%

21

17

Graphically representing the percentage of expenditures that are explicitly and directly aiming to remedy the
lack of investment of public dollars into minority-owned businesses, we reproduce Figure 1 to show the
percentages from the above chart.

Figure 1

Percentage of Oregon State Spending to Explicitly Support
Minority and Women Businesses, 2009 to 2013
100%
90%

100.0%

99.2%

99.1%

99.6%

98.7%

80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

0.1%

0.8%

0.9%

0.4%

1.3%

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2013 State target of 10%, missing
by 8.7 percentage points

Minority & Women %
Non Minority & Women Spend %
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In the above chart, we see the improvements in State contracting practices in the larger context where
minority businesses continue to get a meager slice of public investments.
Our next look at data from the State of Oregon shows the racial breakdown of its MWESB firms. These data
are not available annually (or not been disclosed annually), but rather as an amalgam of the last five years.
Figure 2

Breakdown of awards to MWESB firms by race,
2009-2013, Oregon
Latino
6.7%

Native American
3.4%

Asian
4.4%

Black
2.1%

White
83.5%

Source: Oregon’s State Legislature 2014 report on compliance with HB 2667 (p.15). 5

These numbers are concerning. The Unsettling Profile report documented pervasive problems with minority
contracting practices improving access to contracts by businesses of color because the vast majority of
awards go to emerging small businesses and women-owned businesses. This pattern clearly extends to the
State of Oregon and needs immediate attention.
We turn next to a review of Oregon’s data on the nature of the contracts secured by minority businesses. The
first issue is that the business most used by the State is translation. This service outpaces all others, and holds
18.7% of the contracts awarded (more than 250 such awards over the last 5 years). While this is not
necessarily a problem (and the median salary for translators is $45,000/year compared with the national
median wage of $35,000/year), 6 it suggests that minority contracts are having greater difficulty penetrating a
more expanded set of occupations.
Finally, we turn to examine the departmental patterns of hiring MWESB contractors. There is wide variation
among departments that demonstrates which departments are tough to access. Three awarded no MWESB
contracts: Oregon Health Licensing Authority, Oregon Marine Board and the Public Employees Retirement
System. These bodies awarded relatively few contracts so might remain a lesser priority for reforms. The next
batch include very large contractors, and also include those which have been addressing racial equity for a
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high number of years. The departments that, by all estimation, should be more effective in integrating
minority businesses but are falling significantly short include the Oregon Medical Board, the Department of
Human Services, the Department of Corrections, The Oregon Health Authority, the Oregon State Policy, and
the Department of Justice. We are surprised to see these departments among the worst performers in
MWESB contracting.
Figure 3

Percentage of Contracts to MWESB Firms, Oregon, 2009 to 2013
Department of Labor and Industries (of 19)
Department of Transportation (of 2,005)
Department of Education (of 1,367)*
Office of Emergency Management (of 13)
Public Utility Commission (of 27)
Veterans Affairs (of 7)
Oregon Forest Resources Institute (of 28)
Department of Geology and Minerals (of 7)
Department of Consumer and Business Services (of 204)
Special Commissions and Boards (of 46)
Secretary of State (of 184)
Department of Parks and Recreation (of 1,019)
Department of Energy (of 217)
Community Colleges and Workforce Development (of 106)
Department of Administrative Services (of 1,433)
Department of Forestry (of 395)
Department of Public Safety Standards & Training (of 111)
Oregon Military Department (of 680)
Oregon Housing and Community Services (of 53)
Oregon Liquor Control Commission (of 89)
Department of Fish and Wildlife (of 866)
Department of Environmental Quality (of 184)
Oregon Business Development Department (of 396)
Oregon State Lands (of 155)
Department of Agriculture (of 399)
Oregon Youth Authority (of 840)
Department of Revenue (of 128)
Department of Justice (of 418)
Oregon State Police (of 372)
Oregon Health Authority (of 2,463)
Department of Corrections (of 1,558)
Department of Human Services (of 6,328)
Oregon Medical Board (of 622)
Public Employees Retirement System (of 45)
Oregon Marine Board (of 18)
Oregon Health Licensing Authority (of 7)

26.3%
19.8%
18.9%
15.4%
14.8%
14.3%
14.3%
14.3%
10.3%
8.7%
8.7%
8.1%
7.4%
6.6%
6.4%
6.3%
6.3%
5.7%
5.7%
5.6%
5.3%
4.9%
4.8%
3.9%
3.5%
3.2%
3.1%
2.2%
1.9%
1.4%
1.3%
0.3%
0.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

Source: The HB 2667 Task Force (2014). Breakdown of Agency Purchases, dated 07/02/14. 7
* Note that of the 258 MWESB contracts awarded by ODE, 207 (or 80.2%) of these were for translation services.
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Four messages become clear as these data are reviewed in their entirety:
• The State of Oregon has been unable to significantly improve equity within its contracting practices
• The people of Oregon are unable to discern how minority businesses are benefiting from public
contracting expenditures (because these data combine women-owned businesses with minority
businesses)
• The State of Oregon does not have key data systems in place to be able to see annual progress
• The State of Oregon does not have an effective strategy in place to meet its targets
We look forward to dialogue within the State to establish responses to these challenges in the
implementation of minority contracting policies and procedures.

Multnomah County
Moving our analysis to the County level, we did see some improvement from 2009 to 2012 (as shown in
Figure 4), but significant erosion of gains for minority-owned businesses occurred in 2013, taking the level of
awards to levels lower than they were in 2009, at 5.2%. Back in 2009, Multnomah County, awarded 10 prime
contracts worth $1,112,492 to Minority Business Enterprises, which was 6.1% of prime contract awards from
the County in 2009. In 2013, minority-owned businesses received 11 of 135 prime contracts (6.29% of the
total awarded) for $1,886,058 (5.2% of the total prime contract funds awarded). In each metric – the dollars
awarded, the number of contracts, and the percentage these awarded dollars make up of total awards has
dropped in the past year.
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Figure 4
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Source: Curry-Stevens et al (2010) for 2009 data, and Multnomah County Purchasing Report 2013 for remaining
data. 8

We look forward to seeing Multnomah County engage seriously with community advocates on this issue.
While their reporting is easier to grasp, and the portion of funds awarded to minority-owned businesses
more clear, the results are troubling.

Metro
Metro's goal as of 2010 was 17% of contract dollars to MWESBs and they hit 16% as of 2006/2007, which is a
level that has not ever been achieved. These data, as previously mentioned, were not disaggregated and so it
is hard to establish a baseline for minority-owned businesses when comparing the data published in 2010 to
now. However, looking at the 2012/2013 annual report for Metro's MWESB program, the data is
disaggregated and we can get a sense of how minority-owned businesses are doing with regards to Metro
contracts.
In Fiscal Year 2012/2013, Metro awarded 397 contracts worth $44,679,083. Of those, MWESBs received 138
contracts (34.7% of the total contracts) worth $5,900,894 (13.2% of total dollars). When we break that data
down further, we see that minority-owned businesses received 28 contracts (7% of all contracts awarded)
worth $1,286,407 (2.8% of total dollars awarded). The 2012/2013 annual report does not mention a
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utilization goal for all MWESBs but does state that the program wants “to strive for a utilization rate that
mirrors availability of firms in each category, by industry, according to the most current Census and US
Bureau of Labor Statistics data. For instance, if the makeup of the tree pruning market were 4% MBE, then
ideally Metro would expect to have a utilization rate close to that number” (Metro 2013, p. 5).
Figure 5 shows the uneven nature of the expenditures into disadvantaged businesses by Metro. There was an
audit in 2014 that surfaced many inaccuracies and problematic practices in their procurement processes that
suggest that these results are not, however, reliable.
Figure 5
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Source: Metro's FY 2012/2013 annual report (p. 6) and shows their utilization from 2003 through 2013, and updated
added to with Metro’s 2013/14 annual report figures. 9

In 2010, Curry-Stevens et al expressed concerns about the results of the utilization data they had examined,
saying that “the results show that these policies do not ensure equitable outcomes, nor are the results
improving. The pattern is tremendously uneven” (p.56). We can see while progress is being made in the last
three years, utilization data for all MWESBs remains short of the goal cited in 2010 at 17%. If one were only
to examine the last three years, progress would be deemed exemplary, but we are reticent to believe this is a
durable improvement. Doubt, however, as to the accuracy of these figures exists.
Metro published an audit of their MWESB procurement program in March of 2014 that leads us to question
the accuracy of the above data: Auditor Flynn pointed out that “Metro reported different numbers for the
same fiscal year in two different budget documents. Further, the measures in the budget did not match those
in the annual report” (p.9). 10 In a more concerning conclusion, the Auditor’s office states, “Over the past four
years, the report was completed by four different analysts and we found no clear or consistent guidance on

17

how to create it. In addition, there was no process in place to catch potential errors or inaccuracies. As a
result, the MWESB utilization data was not comparable between years.” 11

The audit includes a memorandum, sent to all Metro councilors, from Auditor Suzanne Flynn which states,
“Our examination found weaknesses in program design and implementation” and pointed out problems with
clarity of goals, a need for well-developed activity areas, compliance and a need for better performance
measures (p.iii).
The concern here is that public expenditures are a matter of public record; if the data pulled for this report is
problematic or inaccurate, it becomes difficult for taxpayers concerned with racial equity to gain a clear
understanding of the current climate regarding minority contracting. Flynn (2014) has this to say about the FY
2012/2013 data, examined above: “The FY 2012-13 annual report included information about activities that
happened outside of the fiscal year covered by the report. This may provide an inaccurate picture of the
program's activities and their effectiveness” (p.10). Shaw (2010) highlights transparency as a necessary
component of any functional contracting program, and points out, “There is no apparent transparency when
the average citizen has no idea what is happening in government or understands the public procurement
process, or is unable to interpret contracts for outsourced services” (p.11).
While there are gains made in outreach, partnerships, tracking systems and a targeted showcased item (of an
Oregon Zoo exhibit for condors), the program still manifests a dominant pattern of negligible, albeit
important, investments into communities of color.
Figure 6

Metro's Procurement Results, 2013/2014
Minority,
$1,000,000 (1.7%)

Women, $1,300,000
(2.2%)

Emerging small
businesses, $1,200,000
(2.0%)

Non-disadvantaged,
$56,875,000 (94.2%)

Source: Metro’s 2013/14 MWEST Annual Report
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We urge Metro to consider the results of these investments, and to understand that should these patterns
continue, White communities will flourish as communities of color face stalled economic prospects. Working
more assertively to engage with and support minority owned businesses and to direct resources into the
sector will require a more comprehensive approach.

City of Portland
The City of Portland has a troubling record with minority contracting. Curry-Stevens et al (2010) detailed the
findings from 2007-2008, during which time the City “allocated only 0.09% of its contracting dollars to
minority-owned businesses” (p.54).
In June of 2011, the Portland City Council passed Resolution No. 36868 that required the city to take
immediate steps to improve the City’s equity programs, passed on the heels of an updated Disparities Study
(with the last once conducted in 2009) that assessed the need for a MWESB initiative. The Disparities Study
confirmed such a need, and formal impetus was afforded by the City to improve equity in contracting.
Additional steps were outlined in Resolution No. 36944, passed in July 2012 that set a goal of 27% for
minority- and women-owned businesses in construction projects, and related supports to achieve this target
such as requiring equity when subcontracts are established, including expanded rules to maximize
accessibility and reduce the emphasis on pre-qualification on projects under $250,000. These initiatives are
credited with the heightened expectations for equity within the Sellwood Bridge Project
In 2012/2013, the City of Portland reported out on a total of three sectors for which minority-owned data
was available. In these fields of Construction (formal and informal), Housing, and Professional, Technical &
Expert (PTE) Service, the City awarded contracts totaling $462,191,060. In those fields, minority-owned
businesses received contracts totaling $36,381,160. As a share of the total city contracts awarded, it comes
to 7.9% of total funds, as shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7

All City of Portland Contracts Reported in 2012/13 Annual
Procurement Report
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All Contracts - Other
than Minority,
92.1%

Source: City of Portland Procurement Services Annual Report, 2012/13. 12

These are important gains, not to be maligned. Moving the institution from 0.09% to 7.9% of contracting
dollars over a five-year period is considerable and there should be important learnings here for other
jurisdictions. The types of efforts that seem to be helpful in expanding these gains include the following, with
critiques being wrapped into these descriptions because the initiatives have emerged with variations and
inconsistences that limit their ability to work in the ways they were intended:
• Good Faith Effort Program that asks larger prime construction contractors to subcontract with minorityand women-owned businesses when possible
o Critique: Without accountability, the program is seen by most minority contractors as a “check
the box” exercise that has a low threshold, with no consequence for failing to show good faith.
The process is actually a nuisance to minority contractors and creates false expectations.
• Workforce Training and Hiring Program that aims to diversity its own workforce in public works by
expanding apprenticeship opportunities in 20% of hours in each trade.
o Critique: As yet, we have not seen if the numbers of apprenticeship hours has increased. Sharing
results is needed to see whether this program is increasing equity.
• Sheltered Market Program that aims to expand access to City contracts under $200,000, by allowing
MWESB-certified firms to enroll for up to five years to have access to these construction projects.
o Critique: A City audit of this program in 2010 demonstrated numerous problems including
discovery that 76% of these contracts were awarded to white-owned businesses over a 12-year
history of the program. 13 This is a slice of a bigger problem whereby (in 2007/08) less than 1/10
of one percent of all construction contract dollars were awarded to minority businesses. 14 In
addition, data systems were flagged as inadequate for tracking outcomes. Also, the results of the
program – supporting disadvantaged businesses to graduate through to open competitions for
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•

contracts – was inadequate: only 66 of 306 participating firms graduated. Greater transparency
on the current program results, validated by minority contractors, would be valuable for
confirming the program is reporting improved results.
Technical Assistance Program that provides classes in areas such as computer programs, bidding,
estimating and creating business plans.
o Critique: Training for development in areas like bidding and estimating, and computer literacy
went away with the advent of the Prime Contractor Development program. There may be some
elements of it on their one CBA project but those services are generally not accessible for most
minority contractors.
Prime Contractor Development Program that provides support for businesses transitioning to higher
contract levels, with education and technical assistance provided.
o Critique: The composition of this group heavily reflects white males or DBE contractors who have
a reputation for hiring their own people. Of the members of the Tier 1 team, 9 of 15 members do
not hold experience as minority contractors, and in the Tier 2 team, 9 of 14 members do not
have this experience. It should be an effective program but diversity without accountability for
making improved decisions with improved results remains hollow. It is a perfect example of
“diversity for the sake of diversity rather diversity for the sake equity.” It gives the appearance of
influence when fact, it has no influence on the procurement making process for real. There are
no numbers to demonstrate effectiveness.
Minority Evaluator Program that aims to evaluate contract bids by a panel of at least three people, one
of which must represent the interest of minority contractors.
o Critique: This program lacks power to influence hiring, or even recommend hiring of people of
color or minority-owned businesses. The panels have difficulty recruiting minority contractors.
Numerous minority contractors find fault with the creation of the program and its
implementation.

These interventions have, however, been unable to take the program close to the goal of 27% set in 2012 for
contracts awarded to minority- and women-owned businesses.
In the next section, we will examine the problem of obtaining clear data regarding minority contracting,
through a conversation with James Posey, who has been a minority contractor in the Portland area for more
than 25 years.
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Problems with Data Collection and Reporting
James Posey has been a minority contractor in Portland for 25 years, is a former president of the Portland
Coalition of Black Men, co-founder of the local chapter of National Association of Minority Contractors –
Oregon (NAMC-Oregon) and founded the Black Portland Agenda (BPA) Report in 2012 “to create a better
dialog about policies that effect Portland's African American community” (BPA website, “James Posey,” para.
5). Mr. Posey approached the Center to Advance Racial Equity (CARE) earlier this year to help examine
minority contracting issues. Although a broader review of the literature is in the next section, it is instructive
to connect some of Mr. Posey's assertions to current research in the field.
When asked why he was driven to pursue this project, Mr. Posey pointed to his own experience as a minority
contractor and mentioned witnessing “many fallacies, hypocrisy and outright fraudulent nature of many of
the programs purported to help minority contractors level the playing field. While these programs
theoretically are designed to increase minority participation in the lucrative construction market, they in fact
often have the opposite result” (James Posey, personal communication, November 23, 2014). Posey's
thoughts here are substantiated by Sweet's (2006) study of minority contracting in three major metropolitan
areas (including Portland), in which he concludes “As a result of the MBE programs in these three cities,
minority employment did not significantly increase and extant racial disparities in employment did not
significantly decrease” (p.180, emphasis from original publication).
Posey is also concerned with the proportion of government contracts that are going to minorities:
“Minorities need an equitable share of these opportunities in order to support the general welfare of their
families and communities. To the extent we monitor and measure their participation, we can predict
socioeconomic benefits to communities of color, which ultimately benefit the entire community” (Posey,
2014). The question of measuring participation and performance accurately is taken up by Flynn (2014), who
found that Metro's MWESB procurement program “had not developed guidelines to ensure accuracy and
consistency of measures” in their reporting processes. Posey has sought data on various projects in the
Portland metropolitan area and has found, “Often the data is not collected at all but when it is collected it is
incomplete, misleading and/or misrepresented.” He suggests that data is collected and reported “for the
purpose of making the agency look good or at least shielding it from criticism.”
We can illustrate this point by examining the Sellwood Bridge Project's Diversity Dashboards, published on
the project website, www.sellwoodbridge.org. The December 2014 dashboard, which contains data as of
November 30th, 2014, shows that the project has yet to meet its goal of 20% minority contracts – standing at
16.5% of awards, but at only 9% of paid contracts. While there is considerable racial diversity among
potential suppliers (with African Americans at 43%, Native American firms at 14%, Latino at 4% and Asian and
Pacific Islanders at 1%), this does not translate into equity for the contracts awarded. Digging into the
workforce data, however, shows more pressing concerns. A closer examination of the data, conducted by
Greg Schrock and Nathen Lamb, shows that two thirds of African Americans currently employed on the
project are flaggers, who earn the lowest base hourly rate of all trades (more than four dollars less per hour
than the next lowest-paying trade). Multnomah County accurately states workforce composition but their
choice to not report what most of those jobs are and where they are on the wage scale suggests an effort to
obscure less desirable features of the Sellwood Bridge Project. Detailed workforce data on employment
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disaggregated by race and trade is not published on the website along with the dashboard, but can be
obtained by request, as it was for this report. It is worth pointing out here that none of the annual reports on
procurement and/or MWESB utilization from Multnomah County, Metro, the State of Oregon or the City of
Portland contain the complete data tables, scrubbed of any information that could be used to identify
workers.
Posey proposes several solutions to the problem of obtaining clear and correct data from governments who
are engaged in minority contracting. These recommendations will be discussed more after a deeper review of
the existing literature but they include front-end electronic data collection, frequent audits, “online real time
transparency websites” and independent community oversight.
These contributions follow a theme that has existed in writings on racial equity and racial disparities that
Curry-Stevens and the Coalition of Communities of Color have partnered on for the last seven years.
Numerous data systems have generated profiles of systems outcomes that have obscured the details of the
experiences of communities of color. Referred to as the “whiteness bias,” these representations have either
failed to reveal data, amalgamated categories so that we cannot see what has happened to various
communities of color, and neglected routine investigations of racial disparities in public services. 15 It is time
to ensure that data is revealed accurately, routinely and transparently. Only with such practices can the trust
of communities of color be earned. And such information must lead to improvements in accountability
practices such that troubling patterns of inequities can be effectively remedied.
At the same time, it is important to address the discourse regarding race-conscious contracting: we believe
that public agencies hold some fear over the backlash and potential litigation from white contractors that
might flow from becoming more public about their equity initiatives. We think this is a contributing factor in
the lack of transparency on reporting racial outcomes. What might seem like a “no win” situation for public
contractors – being criticized for not meeting their equity goals, and being criticized by those who think such
goals should not exist in the first place – is really an extension of the damage of racism and its corollary of
white privilege. We ponder the privilege involved for white contractors to believe that they are more entitled
to government contracts than minority contractors! We encourage all levels of government to join in an
effort to improve and expand the discourse on racial equity. In today’s political landscape of civil unrest in
the face of inequities, we believe it is an initiative that cannot be left untended.
Attaining this discourse goal and that of data transparency is best done in real partnership with leaders of
color who have lived experiences of the shortcomings of current policies and procedures.

23

A Review of Available Literature
Establishing Best Practices in Minority Contracting
While there is a lot written on government contracting, there is less research that is specifically focused on
the issue of contracting to minority-owned businesses. Lohrentz et al conducted a large, nationwide study
of 40 jurisdictions (cities and counties) that identified several best practices for minority contracting and
their conclusions echo themes that emerge in other studies as well (Bates, 2005; Sweet, 2006; Curry-Stevens
et al, 2010; Shaw, 2010; Jaja, 2013; Office of Inspector General, 2013; Flynn, 2014).
Lohrentz et al (2014) identified 7 best practices for successful programs, defining success as “policies and
practices that tent to increase jobs in diverse, low-income communities and enhance regional asset
distribution” (p.7). Those practices are:
1. Set specific sub-contracting goals and benchmarks
2. Help MWBE firms grow from sub-contractors to prime contractors
3. Work within local political realities and legal requirements
4. Eliminate discrimination at every stage of the procurement process
5. Build in comprehensive strategies to ensure effectiveness of race-neutral programs
6. Set aggressive procurement goals to expand opportunities
7. Encourage micro-enterprise development through contract scale adjustments and set-asides 16
Several of these practices are substantiated elsewhere in the literature. Sweet (2006), in attempting to
empirically assess the efficacy of minority-contracting programs in the U.S., notes that “Those who have
studied MBE programs empirically rarely explicitly addressed the issue of goals of such programs, but instead
have implicitly attributed goals to them” (p.167). Flynn's (2014) audit of the Metro MWESB program
chronicles conflicts between active and passive goals that make it hard to identify what the desired outcomes
of the Metro MWESB program would be. She writes, “Differences in the language used to describe goals
were sometimes subtle, but had a large impact on setting expectations for the program among Metro
employees and program participants” (p.12). Lohrentz et al (2014) identify “policies that set clear goals to
address specific disparities and barriers” as one part of the equation, adding that jurisdictions with clear
goals also “support one reporting agency and coordinated program implementation in all relevant city
departments” (p.7).
Streamlined collection and reporting of clear data is a resounding theme in the literature. Curry-Stevens et al
(2010) pointed out problems in acquiring disaggregated data so that accurate comparisons could be made
and the progress of minority-owned businesses could be tracked from year to year. Shaw (2010) predicts
Posey's concerns (2014) about incomplete and misleading data when she writes, “Theoretically, all
contracting and procurement information is available, but in practice, information can be inaccurate and
misleading” (p.19). The 2014 Metro audit by Flynn notes that “management and staff were unable to identify
how the measures were calculated” in asserting that “Metro needs consistent and reliable information to
determine whether it is reaching its MWESB goals” (p.9). Jaja (2013) proposes the use of real-time tracking
and reporting software (such as ePrismSoft) that would effectively create a “scoreboard” by which the public
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could see and respond to the actions of both government contracting entities and the businesses to whom
they award contracts.
As to the best practices of helping minority-owned firms grow from sub-contractors to primary contractors
and setting aggressive goals to grow opportunity, Bates and Williams (1995) identified three practices that
“actually do promote the longevity of MBE vendors:
1. The presence of a rigorous certification process is positively associated with heightened MBE vendor
survival prospects, and the presence of a staff assigned to assist minority firms produces the same
result.
2. MBE vendors located in areas where bonding requirements are routinely waived for procurement
contracts (or bonding is actually provided by the locality) are much more likely to remain in business,
other things equal, than firms in other areas
3. MBE vendors located in areas where the local government provides working capital assistance to
contract recipients are more likely to remain in operation, other factors constant, than firms in other
areas” (p.16-17).
Shaw (2010) documents the potential for “fraud and scandal” in contracting, and the primary form of fraud
documented in the literature is known as fronting (18). Front firms are nominally MWESB firms that are often
hastily thrown together in order to secure a preferential contract that is actually executed (and therefore
actually benefits) a larger, non-MWESB firm. Bates and Williams (1995) documented the fronting
phenomenon (a concern also raised by James Posey) and were blunt in their assessment: “MBE front
company abuses can be held down by penalizing such activity heavily” (p.21). They went on to suggest that
on-site compliance reviews could serve as easy detection systems for front companies.

Policies to Support and Expand Minority Hiring and Local Hiring
Of equivalent, or possibly greater, importance to who receives public contracts is who gets paid to work on
them. Local governments and community-based actors have developed a variety of tools to ensure that the
benefits of publicly-funded job creation – whether through economic development incentives or public
works projects – are directed toward communities of need, especially those experiencing elevated poverty
and institutional barriers to opportunity, such as racial minorities. In addition to promoting more equitable
outcomes, such policies can also have broader economic benefits for communities. Labor economists like
Tim Bartik of the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research have argued that “demand side” policies that
target employment opportunities toward long-term unemployed and underemployed populations can have
long run benefits for labor force participation and earnings, and enhance the social return on public
investment in economic development projects (Bartik, 2001; 2007). 17

Why are such policies necessary?
Without policy interventions, the labor market on its own is unlikely to ensure diverse, equitable hiring on
public construction projects. There are several reasons for this, including:
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Education and skill gaps: Individuals from disadvantaged communities often experience both lower
educational quality and worse educational outcomes, leading to basic skill deficits in the workforce.
These deficits contribute to difficulty obtaining living-wage positions offering opportunities for skill
development and career advancement. This ultimately compounds the disadvantages facing those
communities.
Informal networks and “workplace culture”: Workers often find out about jobs, and employers find out
about workers, through informal networks that are often reflective of who already is employed and
therefore “in the know.” This perpetuates the disadvantage that underrepresented groups such as racial
minorities and women experience, both because they do not find out about opportunities, and benefit
less from informal mentoring on the job, increasing the likelihood of attrition if workers do not feel
welcomed on the worksite. 18
Institutional racism: Ostensibly race- or gender-neutral policies can have disparate impacts on different
population segments. For example, procedures that require new apprentices to travel long distances
initially for less-desirable jobs to “get off the bench” may have greater negative impacts on workers with
limited capacity to undertake travel, such as single parents or economically disadvantaged persons,
which may perpetuate disparities by race and/or gender. While “fair” on their face, such policies can
reinforce existing advantages and disadvantages, perpetuating disparity and inequity.

Demand-side tools are an important complement to supply-side approaches, such as pre-apprenticeship
programs, which aim to increase the pool of workers from disadvantaged and underrepresented
communities 19. However, these tools alone are often insufficient unless they are coupled with policies that
incent employers to take advantage of their availability. A recent study by the UCLA Labor Center of 33
public construction projects in Seattle found that African American workers made up only 3% of the hours
worked, despite comprising nearly 8% of the city’s population, 20 even though the Seattle region has an
extensive network of construction pre-apprenticeship programs. 21

What tools exist for overcoming these barriers?
Several options exist for promoting the hiring of workers of color and for hiring local workers. While the
priority of hiring local workers does not explicitly aim to hire workers of color, it has an impact that can affect
workers of color. First, when enacted in a comparatively diverse region, it increases the likelihood that
workers of color will be hired over lesser diverse workers in neighboring jurisdictions (as will be
demonstrated in the Sellwood Bridge case study that follows). Second, when local communities receive
economic investments (as local hiring practices create), the benefits are retained in the larger community
which cannot help but spill into overall economic conditions, employment rates and the wage floor which
holds potential to improve wages across the community.
In the following text, we demonstrate the viability of four tools for improving the employment conditions of
workers of color: first source hiring policies, local hiring policies, community benefits agreements, and
project labor agreements.
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First source hiring policies require employers receiving public subsidies or contracts to utilize a
designated workforce agency or intermediary on a preferential basis. This usually means the
establishment of a defined window of time in which those agencies, or referrals from those agencies, are
given “first chance” to fill available positions. The City of Portland was the first U.S. city to adopt a First
Source Hiring policy back in 1978, requiring all economic development incentive recipients to work with
publicly-funded employment and training programs for hiring, and often the creation of customized
training programs to help prepare individuals for those jobs. In the 1980s First Source requirements were
extended to the State of Oregon’s economic development programs, including enterprise zones (EZ) and
lottery-funded programs, and in the 1990s the Portland Development Commission (PDC) used the
“JobNet” program to help target employment toward residents of the North/Northeast Portland
community. First Source Hiring Agreements are still required by PDC and Business Oregon for EZ and
certain other incentive programs, but presently this entails requiring employers to list available
employment opportunities with the Worksource Oregon system. Since First Source policies cannot
obligate employers to hire individuals referred by those agencies, the efficacy of such policies is largely
dependent on the quality of the intermediary and the degree of activity of the relationship with the
employer.

•

Local hire policies are similar to first source policies, but instead specify that employers/contractors must
achieve a specified participation of workers from a defined geography, usually the public jurisdiction
granting the contract or subsidy. Local hire requirements have been subject to considerable legal
challenges over the years, with courts generally holding that such requirements on economic
development incentive recipients are not constitutional due to their infringement of individuals’
“privileges and immunities” to work across jurisdictions. However, courts have been more open to the
establishment of local hire requirements in public contracting, especially if the source of funding is state
or local, rather than federal. Federal agencies such as the Federal Highway Administration explicitly
prohibit local recipients from establishing local hire goals or targets on their projects, which fund the vast
majority of transportation-related projects in the United States 22. Boston’s Resident Jobs Policy is a good
example of a local hire policy 23; it stipulates that 50% of hours worked on City-funded construction
projects must be by city residents, 25% by racial minorities, and 10% by women. In practice, however,
local governments have been somewhat reticent to enforce local hire requirements for fear of provoking
further legal challenges.

•

Community benefits agreements (CBA) are negotiated contracts between a project developer and a
consortium of community representatives, typically with the direct or indirect participation of public
agencies financially or legally involved in the project. 24 CBAs are designed to maximize beneficial impacts
of projects on communities, especially disadvantaged communities, by obligating developers to
contribute toward measures, such as affordable housing or parks construction, which offset potential
negative impacts such as displacement or congestion. At the same time, CBAs often include provisions
that require for hiring of local residents and/or residents from disadvantaged populations during the
construction phase (often in conjunction with project labor agreements, discussed below) and for
“permanent” jobs in cases of commercial developments. CBAs emerged in the 2000s in Los Angeles
around projects like the LA Live/Staples Center redevelopment project, and have been adopted in a
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number of cities throughout the U.S. Because they are negotiated agreements between private
developers and community coalitions, rather than governmental policies, CBAs are often better
positioned to include local hiring provisions, and provisions for racial diversity, which are forbidden in
several states, including California and Washington State. However, the efficacy of CBAs as a social and
racial equity tool depends greatly on the capacity and willingness of community representatives and
public agencies to monitor and enforce the provisions agreed to by developers.
•

Project labor agreements with community workforce provisions are similar to CBAs in that they specify
targeting goals and procedures, except that they require labor unions to formally agree to stipulations
that support local workforce conditions. A Project Labor Agreement (or PLA) is a negotiated contract
between project owners and a consortium of labor unions to establish protocols for a specific building
project on variety of issues relating to working conditions, dispute resolution and hiring. 25 Many major
construction projects, public and private, in Oregon involve PLAs, which help to mitigate labormanagement conflict and ensure timely completion. In some cases, PLAs are completed on an agencywide or “master” basis, applying to all projects of a particular size. It is important to note that PLAs are
not inherently designed to promote equity and inclusion, especially in terms of minority contracting, 26
and without strong community workforce provisions, are often part of the problem to the extent that
they enforce the use of union hiring procedures that have perpetuated disparities and
underrepresentation. However, PLAs can be a useful vehicle for community workforce provisions that
achieve targeting goals. Apprentice utilization rates are a common provision of PLAs, but they can go
further, to specify goals for women and racial minority workforce participation, local hiring outcomes,
and even hiring priority from designated pre-apprenticeship programs (called “direct” or “preferred
entry” provisions). As with CBAs, their value is greatest where transparency and accountability are
achieved, through oversight committees where community representatives, construction trade unions,
contractors and public agencies/owners can review and scrutinize project outcomes. But since public
agencies are not signatories to PLAs, they have limited tools to enforce community workforce provisions
within those agreements.

Each of these tools provides important levers to enhance conditions for minority owned businesses and for
workers of color. That said, and as will be demonstrated in the case study that follows, an unenforced policy
is worse than no policy at all, because policies provide the semblance of progress where none exists, and
they raise expectations for workers that are not going to materialize. The net result is that we are left with a
local landscape that looks promising but that requires reports such as these to investigate and decipher.
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Case Study: The Sellwood Bridge Project
In summer 2012, construction began on a replacement for the Sellwood Bridge (SWB) in southeast Portland.
Multnomah County, which owns the bridge and is overseeing the project, awarded the construction contract
to Slayden-Sundt JV, a joint venture between Slayden Construction of Slayton, Oregon (Marion County) and
Sundt of Tempe, Arizona. As of January 2015, construction is more than two-thirds complete on the
replacement bridge, which is scheduled to open in early 2016.
Multnomah County and Slayden-Sundt have made diversity a prominent part of their public relations
strategy for the SWB project. In its Diversity Plan approved by Multnomah County in September 2011 27,
Slayden-Sundt laid out a series of quantitative benchmarks for contractor and workforce diversity, including:
• 20% of total construction contract value to Disadvantaged, Minority, Women and Emerging Small
Business (DMWESB) contractors;
• 20% of labor hours for each apprenticeable trade on large subcontracts to be performed by state
registered apprentices 28;
• “Aspirational” goals of 20% of hours worked by racial minorities and 14% by women.
In addition, Slayden-Sundt committed to a variety of outreach, technical assistance, and capacity building
efforts that are common to such projects.
How well is the SWB project achieving its goals? We obtained data from Multnomah County regarding
contractor and workforce outcomes, updated through September 2014. Our analysis identifies a series of
shortcomings with the contracting and employment outcomes from the SWB project. We have organized
these findings into two categories: contracting and workforce, and provided summary statements as to our
insights of these data, along with justification for these insights.

Contracting Findings
Here we detail shortcomings of the contracting goals, disaggregated to identify the progress achieved by
minority owned businesses, and the total investments into these businesses.
a. As of September 2014, the SWB project was short of its 20% DMWESB contracting goal.
The Sellwood Bridge project has struggled to approach its DMWESB goal of 20% participation. As of last
September, they stood at 16.4% - $35.7 million of $217.4 million total – contracted to DMWESBs. Although
this represents an increase from one year earlier, when they stood at less than 13%, they are still nearly $8
million below the level necessary to reach their diversity contracting target 29.
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Figure 8

Sellwood Bridge Contracts by DMWESB status, as
September 2014
MBE,
$23,329,255
(10.7%)
Non-DMWESB
firms,
$181,685,387
(83.6%)

WBE (Non-MBE),
$9,898,470 (4.6%)
ESB (NonMBE/WBE),
$2,481,971
(1.1%)

Source: Authors’ analysis of Sellwood Bridge Project (SWB) contractor data, obtained from Multnomah County.

b. State-certified minority business enterprises represent roughly 11% of SWB contract totals.
It is critical to break down the broad category of DMWESB contractors into the three overlapping categories
of minority, women and “emerging small businesses” (i.e., recently-started businesses). Using data from the
State’s Oregon Minority, Women and Emerging Small Business (OMWESB) database 30, we coded SWB
contractors based on the categories for which they are certified. State-registered Minority Business
Enterprises (MBEs) represent 10.7% of total contracts (Figure 1), totaling $23.3 million. By comparison, 4.6%
($9.9 million) of total contracts have gone to non-minority, Women-owned businesses (WBE), while 1.1%
($2.5 million) have gone to ESBs not certified as either minority- or women-owned.
The contract share allocated to federally-qualified DBE contractors varies greatly across the three categories.
Among MBEs, 60% of the total contracts went to DBEs, with 40% going to larger, established businesses no
longer eligible for DBE status. Among WBEs not registered as MBEs, only 31% of contract totals went to
DBEs 31, and among remaining ESBs (12 contracts totaling $2.5 million), none were certified DBEs. Overall,
DBE contractors represented less than half (48%) of the DMWESB total, suggesting that smaller, less
established MBEs are not benefitting as much.
c. Minority-owned businesses are engaged on smaller contracts than non-MBEs.
A total of 55 contracts worth $23.3 million have gone to 40 minority-owned businesses for the SWB project,
for an average contract size of $424,168. This is significantly smaller than the average non-prime (i.e., other
than Slayden-Sundt) contract size of nearly $600,000. For DBE-eligible MBEs the average contract is much
lower, at $167,201. Among African-American contractors, the average contract for DBE-eligible firms (18
firms, 26 contracts) is slightly higher ($297,011) than the MBE average 32, while much lower for AsianAmerican (4 firms, 4 contracts, $138,302) and Hispanic-owned MBEs (12 firms, 12 contracts, $83,258). This
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suggests that MBEs are engaged primarily on small subcontracts with fewer opportunities to gain experience
and build wealth.

Workforce Findings
Workforce measures are typically reported by the numbers of hours worked by each community, and the
second is to add additional complexities to these hours worked, such as wages earned and types of
employment. We then wanted to dig a little deeper into an assessment of the degree to which using minority
contractors actually generates solid employment for workers of color.
a. So far, the SWB project is exceeding its 20% aspirational goal for minority workforce participation.
The total employment figures are positive, with communities of color accessing 28.8% of the work hours
expended on the SWB project, as of the early fall of 2014. Figure 9 below shows that while this is laudable, it
is a relatively similar level as the overall Multnomah County workforce data, which has workers of color at
26.0% of the workforce. This shows that overall access to employment has been well-addressed such that
workers of color enter the jobs in the SWB project at levels equivalent to their workforce population.
It is, however, possible that employers who are expected to hire workers of color do so on a temporary basis
or do so at such few hours of employment as to compel us to look, instead, at hours of work to discern more
durable benefits of these public expenditures. As of September 2014, nearly 30% of the hours worked on the
SWB project were by persons of color (POC), exceeding the 20% aspirational goal for racial diversity (Figure
9). Among racial/ethnic groups, Hispanic workers represented the largest share, with over 12% of hours
worked, followed by African-Americans (9%), Native Americans (5%), and Asian/Pacific Islanders (2.3%). This
compares favorably to the racial diversity of the adult workforce in Multnomah County, with the exception of
Asian/Pacific Islanders, who are significantly underrepresented relative to their population share.
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Figure 9

Sellwood Bridge Hours Worked by Worker Race/Ethnicity

71.2%
74.0%

White/Caucasian

12.4%
10.5%

Hispanic

9.0%

African-American

4.5%

5.0%

Native American

0.4%

2.3%
3.4%

Asian/Pacific Islander

28.8%
26.0%

Persons of Color total

0%

10%

20%

30%

% SWB Hours

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

% Mult Co workforce

Source: Authors’ analysis of SWB project workforce data, obtained from Multnomah County. Multnomah County
workforce data based on authors’ analysis of 2011-13 American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Series.

b. This aggregate total, however, masks wide disparities in the quality of jobs held by Whites and by
Persons of Color, especially African Americans.
There is a significant wage gap for White workers and workers of color on the SWB project. The average
wage for White workers was nearly $32 per hour, compared to $27.55 for workers of color – a gap of nearly
14% (Figure 10). For African Americans the gap is even greater, with an average wage of only $22.34 – nearly
$10 less per hour than White workers.
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Figure 10

Sellwood Bridge Hours Worked by Worker Race/Ethnicity
Average
hourly
wage

% of Total Hours Worked
White/Caucasian

$31.83

Hispanic

$28.78
$22.34

African-American

$32.58

Native American

$30.49

Asian/Pacific Islander

$27.55

Persons of Color total
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Average
wage =
$30.60

% SWB Hours
% Mult Co workforce

Source: Authors’ analysis of SWB project workforce data, obtained from Multnomah County. Multnomah County
workforce data based on authors’ analysis of 2011-13 American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Series.

The primary reason for this gap is because persons of color are concentrated in lower-paid trades such as
Flaggers and other Laborers, and with some exceptions, underrepresented in higher-paid trades (Figure 11).
For example, Persons of Color worked three-fourths of all hours in Flagging – the lowest-paid position at an
average journey-level wage of approximately $21 per hour – and nearly 40% of other Laborer hours
($27/hour), but only 11% of Operators ($34/hour) and 18% of Pilebucks. Amazingly, nearly two out of three
hours worked by African-Americans were as Flaggers.
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Figure 11

Sellwood Bridge Hours Worked by Trade and Worker Race/Ethnicity
Average
journey
wage
Operator

$35.10

Pilebuck

$34.24

Laborer

$27.58

Flagger

$21.32

Carpenter

$31.29

Ironworker

$35.69

Other Trades

Average =
$31.82
0%

White/Caucasian

20%
Hispanic

40%

African-American

60%
Native American

80%

100%

Asian-American

Source: Authors’ analysis of SWB project workforce data, obtained from Multnomah County.

One of the few bright spots among higher-paid trades are the Ironworkers, for which 63% of the hours
worked on the SWB project have been Persons of Color. However, closer analysis shows that this has been
almost entirely attributable to Latino workers; there were no hours worked by African-Americans in this
trade. This suggest that some trades may be making inroads within certain communities of color, but not all.
c. Minority-owned businesses show a higher rate of minority workforce utilization than White-owned
businesses.
Over half (56%) of hours worked by minority-owned businesses were by Persons of Color, compared to only
23% for White-owned businesses. To some extent this gap is skewed by two minority-owned flagging
businesses; excluding these two, minority workforce utilization is somewhat lower (38%), but still nearly twothirds higher than White-owned businesses. This reflects the tendency for MBEs to be concentrated in
lower-paid, manual labor fields, but it also suggests that majority-owned firms – and the trade unions they
draw workers from – are less successful in connecting with diverse communities in their recruitment and
hiring.
d. Multnomah County workers on the SWB project are more diverse than the regional figures, but
represent only one-quarter of hours worked and approximately one-fifth of earnings.
One factor hindering workforce diversity on the SWB project is the relatively low utilization of workers from
within Multnomah County, who tend to be more racially diverse. Less than one-quarter of hours worked
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(24%) and roughly one-fifth (20.7%) of earnings went to Multnomah County workers. By contrast, Clackamas
County workers have garnered nearly one in six hours (16%) on the project, followed by Clark County
(Washington) at 13%. Workers drawn from within Multnomah County were much more racially diverse, with
53% persons of color compared to 21% of workers from elsewhere. The low utilization of Multnomah County
workers stands in stark contrast to the funding for the project, of which over three-fourths (78%) comes from
the City of Portland and Multnomah County taxpayers. 33 However, because the SWB project is funded in
small part through federal monies, they have been unable to incorporate local hiring goals. Yet in the
absence of such goals, we can see that the vast majority of the work will go to residents of other jurisdictions,
reducing both the public return on investment and opportunities to benefit communities of color.
A full set of data tables is included in the Appendix.

Summary
The Sellwood Bridge Project shows the critical importance of digging deeper into the data to see what is
happening with contracting and hiring on large public construction projects. Top-level goals for DMWESB
and minority workforce utilization can mask as much as they reveal. For example, it shows that statecertified minority-owned businesses have gotten only 11% of the contracts for the project, less than half of
total DMWESB contracts have gone to disadvantaged businesses, and that MBE contracts tend to be, on
average, much smaller than those of majority-owned businesses. And while the project has more than met
its 20% goal for workforce racial diversity, it is clear that Persons of Color – African-Americans in particular –
are locked into the lowest-paid trades with the fewest opportunities for upward mobility. As a result, far less
of the material benefits – in terms of income and wealth – are flowing back to communities of color within
Multnomah County.
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Recommendations
Five categories of recommendations are advanced in this report: (1) regional strategies, (2) accountability
and data systems, (3) innovations, (4) incentives and sanctions, and (5) discourse and awareness efforts.
These surface from our investigation of practices at the State, County, City and Metro levels, and specifically
investigated in the Sellwood Bridge Project. Our recommendations are rooted in the evidence of
shortcomings with the minority contracting policies and practices. We remain enthusiastic about the
potential for the program, particularly as shown in the literature. Given the ability of successful minority
contracting programs to increase wealth in communities of color, mitigate the impacts of historical
discrimination, and support a more even distribution of income and assets within regional economies, we
find it essential to work with policy makers at multiple levels to advance improvements to the MWESB
minority owned business contracting system.
Regional Strategy
Our central recommendation is to implement a regional strategy to provide work opportunities for minority
contractors (Lohrentz et al, 2014). This strategy should require active participation of all departments and
agencies, include clear goals and benchmarks, provide assistance in navigating the MWESB certification
process, and employ streamlined methods of data collection and reporting that are clear, accountable, and
accessible to the public in real time. A program such as ePrismSoft could be utilized to collect and publish
such data and it could be published in the form of an online “scoreboard” to guarantee transparency and
measure progress (Jaja, 2013). Lohrentz et al also recommend creating or designating “one reporting agency
for the whole city or county, as is done in jurisdictions such as New York City, Philadelphia, Houston and
Baltimore” (p.33).
The development of a regional strategy should include multiple levels of government, and establishing
standards which need to be adhered to across departments and regions. The State of Oregon should convene
these tables, include leading community experts on this topic (we can provide a list of suggested experts),
and should come to the table with an attitude of humility that reflects its own deeply flawed outcomes.
While the State is an appropriate convening group, it has much to learn about effective contracting practices
and accountability measures.
We add a stronger vision to this regional strategy about the establishment of targets for both minority
contractors as well as workforce hiring. We believe it is time to embark on serious conversation about need,
for some communities have stronger needs than others.
It is time to let ourselves be informed by needs – on the basis of the size of the population, and considering a
metric that is not tied to available workers, but rather by the population itself, and give us higher aspirations
to ensure that more people of color become prepared for and eligible for work in sectors where public
investments are being made. So too we need to consider the profile of the unemployed population – which
surfaces where the need for employment is greatest. We reproduce these data below to begin to catalyze
thinking about appropriate targets for hiring workers of color and for minority contracting.
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Figure 12

Adult Population of Multnomah County, 2006-2010 average
Pacific Islander
0.7%
Asian
7.3%

Latino
8.3%

Native American
2.5%
Black
5.9%
White
75.4%

Source: American Community Survey, 2006-2010. Please note that this larger time span allows the Census Bureau
(who publish these data) to share information on smaller communities, such as Pacific Islanders.

Figure 12, above, suggests that there should perhaps be more robust metrics used to set appropriate targets
for workforce hiring. If we were to use these metrics, the performance of the SWB project would remain
positive, but not surpassing targets in the same magnitude.
Figure 13

Unemployment Rates, Multnomah County
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(2006/10 average)
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(2011/13 average)
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(2011/13 average)

4%
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0%
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Black

Native
American

Asian
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Source: American Community Survey, varying years. We opted to use more current figures when available for most
communities so they better reflected current economic conditions. The years of data are detailed in the figure.
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Please notice that we are not saying that these need to be targets or metrics to assess success; rather, we
invite policy makers and stakeholders to consider that “need” could factor into the establishment of targets
in more effective ways. We hope to be invited to these policy tables to share our perspectives and open
dialogue about the importance of wrapping issues of need into targets, anticipating that these would include
population levels, unemployment rates, poverty rates, “hard to employ” populations, geographic areas
where needs are highest, and sectors where communities of color have been unable to penetrate barriers to
the profession.
Accountability and Data Systems
a. Standardized policy frameworks
At the top of our list is the need to develop policy frameworks that ensure that data on the status of
minority contracting is shared routinely, accurately, and transparently. Using the same system and
outcome metrics across jurisdictions is recommended so that results are comparable and so that the
community is able to effectively discern progress and challenges.
b. Reporting details expanded
Greater detail in reporting is important to ensure that we can understand the effectiveness in minority
contracting in different communities. Disaggregating expectations should follow the requirements of
House Bill 2134, which currently applies only to the Oregon Health Authority and the Department of
Human Services and those with who they contract and subcontract. 34 It is expected that similar
legislation will increasingly spread to other departments in the coming years.
c. Worker level details expanded
We also want to ensure that we can separate workforce activities for apprentice and journey-level
workers. We would like to discern the degree to which apprentice opportunities are (a) completed, and
(b) lead to well-paying jobs. We simultaneously want to ensure that the bulk of employment hours for
workers of color serve to expand their future employment opportunities, equivalently with those
available to white workers. Dead-end jobs do not well serve communities of color. The type of
occupational segregation uncovered in the Sellwood Bridge Project necessitates a cohesive approach to
both monitoring and remedy. We urge the exploration of establishing a trade-specific lens on its barriers
to recruitment, retention and promotion of workers, as well as robust and transparent commitments to
eradicating inequities. This would ideally be aligned with strong government expectations for achieving
trade-specific employment equity, and to disclosing these intentions and outcomes publicly.
d. Inclusion forecasting
Government organizations who are serious about addressing equity could also engage in long-term
inclusion forecasting – that is, implementing a process whereby future projects are examined to identify
potential inclusion opportunities. In fact, local policymakers could lead efforts to establish a
comprehensive economic development plan focused on providing access to the full range of
procurement processes, including new infrastructure funding.
e. Independent audits
We also need regular independent audits of projects to guarantee proper collection and reporting of
data. It is important that data be reliable and effective; too often our own research had questions about
accuracy of data and sometimes questions surfaced about the degree to which undesirable patterns
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might have been intentionally obscured. Audits would both eliminate our concerns as well as promoting
greater accuracy by firms and by project managers.
Innovations
a. Pathways to advancement
The identification of the prevalence of employment of workers of color as flaggers is obviously troubling.
We would like to see partnerships between governments and contractors to support the employment
opportunities for low-end workers, and the establishment of recognized and supported pathways to
advancement. These can be accompanied by a combination of incentives (where pathways are
successful) and sanctions (where pathways are not made available for workers). An additional idea is to
expand partnerships across sectors: if union apprenticeship programs in higher paid fields could recruit
from lower paid fields like laborers and flaggers, which tend to be more diverse, we could bridge workers
of color to higher paid jobs. We would also expand this idea in pre-apprenticeship programs, again which
tend to be more diverse.
b. Moratorium on low-bid selection process
Another significant recommendation is for organizations to provide a moratorium on the low-bid process
in favor of a negotiated or best-value bid arrangement. This would allow diversity/inclusion to feature
more prominently as factors in the selection process (see Jaja, 2013 and Lohrentz et al, 2014).
c. Expanded role of equity in bid selection process
To replace the low-bid selection process, we recommend that additional features be included in the
decision-making practices of awarding contracts. These features should include the contractors’ past
minority and local hiring performance (ideally that has been validated by public agencies), expectations
for enhanced hiring of workers of color, improved opportunities for lower-end workers, and penalties for
failed promises in past contracts. While some language exists for similar criteria to be considered, it is
generally believed that equity criteria are rarely integrated into decision-making.
d. Expand local and first source hiring
We need to strengthen first source and local hiring policies, and community workforce provisions within
Project Labor Agreements on public construction projects. While we endorse heightened expectations in
both these areas (to hire locally and to hold requirements to hire workers of color), we repeat our
assertion that an unenforced policy is worse than no policy at all; these policies simply must be
enforceable.
Incentives and Sanctions
a. Wage reimbursement for priority communities
An incentive program modeled on the current Workforce Training program (which reimburses $20.00 per
hour for every apprenticeship hour worked up to 10,000 hours), should be implemented. Additional
reimbursements could be possible for primary contractors whose apprenticeship hours are worked by
African Americans or Asian Americans (two of the most underrepresented workforce groups based on
the disparity study). Such an incentive program could be utilized in conjunction with the Oregon
Department of Transportation's Mentor/Protégé program, allowing primary contractors to recoup
additional expenses with helping to develop and train a minority-owned firm. The use of mentor/protégé
programs is identified by Lohrentz et al (2014) as a “promising practice” in capacity building that is
currently used in Charlotte and Houston (p.35). To protect against the fraud Bates and Williams (1995)
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warn of, the program should require prime contractors to clearly identify the MBE firm and the specific
type of work that is to be performed. This should go through an approval process that not only includes
ODOT representation but also minority contracting representation in order to validate the legitimacy of
the relationship (thus guarding against the practice of fronting) and that the relationship can deliver on
the goal of building capacity and expertise in the minority contracting community.
b. Serious sanctions for failed diversity histories
Businesses that receive awards with promises or expectations that they will hire workers of color, and
subsequently do not make such hires need to face sanctions. So too do unions that create roadblocks to
diversity in hiring. While the reach of such sanctions needs to be determined, it is important to provide
sanctioning capacity for governments who award minority contracts. These sanctions should consider a
wide range of options, up to and including disbarment from certification for repeated low performance.
Discourse and Awareness Efforts
a. It is time for public agencies to work across jurisdictions and to partner with community advocates and
bring forward both the ethics of racial equity (and the injustices of racial inequities) and the social and
economic imperative for expanding their role in addressing racial disparities. We see this as important for
eliminating the concerns that many in public agencies hold in being transparent about their equity
initiatives. It is essential for our collective future for everyone in the region to have real opportunities for
a positive future; a vision that will simultaneously improve our standing in national rankings of prosperity
and in international rankings of human development.

Conclusion
Our journey through this research has been intriguing and illuminating. We have used our review of the
literature, of the results gained by various jurisdictions, and our deep dive into the outcomes of the Sellwood
Bridge Project to draw a tight conclusion: the promise of minority contracting remains intact, but the net
impacts on workers of color, and communities that benefit from the investments of public dollars has not
been realized to anywhere near their full potential. Improvements to this situation is essential, and we hope
that our public sector leaders understand the depths of the work needed to turn the promise into much
more solid outcomes.
Our priorities for action are multifaceted: (1) build effective data systems that track progress in accurate,
timely and transparent ways, (2) establish targets in more relevant ways so that “need” features as a higher
priority, (3) create a robust accountability structure that integrates use of effective incentives and sanctions,
(4) integrate viable innovations that promote stronger worker and community wellbeing, and (5) work
regionally to establish enhanced capacity to reach the promise of minority contracting.
We look forward to seeing these ideas integrated within policy dialogues and to seeing the potential for
minority contracting to come to fruition.
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Appendix: Sellwood Bridge (SWB) Project Contractor and Workforce Diversity
Analysis Tables
Table 1a
Total SWB contracts and subcontracts by DMWESB status

Non-DMWESB firms
DMWESB firms
MBE
WBE (Non-MBE)
DBE/ESB (Non-MBE/WBE)
Total

November 2013
Contracted
$192,941,868
$18,705,520
$11,482,188
$5,387,226
$1,836,106
$211,647,388

% of total
91.2%
8.8%
5.4%
2.5%
0.9%

September 2014
Contracted
$189,700,677
$27,694,405
$15,083,670
$9,898,470
$2,273,320
$217,395,083

% of total
87.3%
12.7%
6.9%
4.6%
1.0%

Table 1b
Total SWB contracts and subcontracts by Owner Race/Ethnicity

White/Caucasian*
African-American
Native American
Hispanic
Asian-American**
Total
Minority contractors, total

November 2013
Contracted
$194,024,141
$11,870,788
$4,911,861
$585,933
$254,655
$211,647,378
$17,623,237

% of total
91.7%
5.6%
2.3%
0.3%
0.1%
100%
8.3%

September 2014
Contracted
$194,065,827
$15,737,574
$6,039,373
$999,099
$553,209
$217,395,083
$23,329,255

% of total
89.3%
7.2%
2.8%
0.5%
0.3%
100%
10.7%

* Businesses not listed in OMWESB database assumed to be White/Caucasian.
** includes South Asian and Asian-Pacific categories
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Table 1c
Total SWB contracts, awarded versus paid, by Owner Race/Ethnicity, as of September 2014

White
African-American
Native American
Hispanic
Asian-American
Total
Minority contractors, total

September 2014
Awarded
$194,065,827
$15,737,574
$6,039,373
$999,099
$553,209
$217,395,083
$23,329,255

Paid
$130,729,947
$4,220,207
$4,152,291
$475,532
$185,283
$139,763,260
$9,033,313

Paid as % of
Awarded
67%
27%
69%
48%
33%
64%
39%

Table 1d
Total SWB non-prime contracts by Owner Race/Ethnicity and DMWESB status
Owner Race/Ethnicity
White
African-American
Native American
Hispanic
Asian-American
Total
Minority contractors, total

Firms
109
18
6
12
4
149
40

Contracts
152
27
12
12
4
207
55

Awarded
$100,121,586
$15,737,574
$6,039,373
$999,099
$553,209
$123,450,842
$23,329,255

Average Contract
$658,695
$582,873
$503,281
$83,258
$138,302
$596,381
$424,168

By DMWESB status
MBE contractors
MBE/DBE contractors
All DBE contractors

Firms
39
34
55

Contracts
54
48
77

Awarded
$15,083,670
$8,025,668
$11,485,060

Average Contract
$279,327
$167,201
$149,157
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Table 1e
Largest SWB Minority Contractors

Contractor
Carr Construction*
McDonald Excavating
O'Neill Electric
Pacificmark Construction
Corp.
PTS Surveying
Munitor Construction
Tri-Star Flagging

Location
Portland
Washougal,
WA
Portland

Owner
Race/Ethnicity
African-American
Native American
African-American
African-American
Native American
Native American
African-American

Meko Construction**
Affordable Electric Inc.
A D Traffic Control Services
Northwest Infrastructure
Azuri Construction, Inc.
R & R General Contractors

Milwaukie
Hillsboro
Newberg
Oregon City
Woodinville,
WA
Fairview
Portland
Portland
Portland
Portland

Green Art Landscape &
Irrigation
MSD Construction

Hillsboro
Hillsboro

Asian-American
Hispanic

African-American
African-American
African-American
African-American
Hispanic
Hispanic

Minority contractors, total

# of
Contracts
1

Net Contracted
$8,015,291

Net Paid as
of Sept 2014
$313,271

$3,876,670
$2,867,564

$2,735,517
$13,509

$1,739,581
$1,014,970
$1,007,793
$996,212

$1,326,453
$835,597
$439,020
$836,126

$468,993
$467,708
$383,559
$333,981
$327,216
$282,290

$456,436
$416,454
$397,071
$201,926
$0
$128,733

2

$254,665
$232,261

$46,771
$163,896

55

$23,329,255

$9,033,313

1
2
3
1
1
1
2
2
1
3
1
1
1

* Not currently certified as MBE by State of Oregon, because it exceeded revenue limits.
** Excluded from DBE/MBE calculations because it failed the “Commercially Useful Function Test” by Multnomah
County.
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Table 2a
SWB Hours Worked and Earnings by Race/Ethnicity, as of September 2014
Race/Ethnicity
White
Hispanic
African-American
Native American
Asian-American
Unknown
Total
Persons of Color***,
total

Hours
282,399
49,207
35,878
19,776
9,295
109
396,663

% of Hrs
71.2%
12.4%
9.0%
5.0%
2.3%
0.0%
100%

Earnings*
$8,987,944
$1,416,232
$801,402
$644,232
$283,417
$3,573
$12,136,801

% of
Earnings
74.1%
11.7%
6.6%
5.3%
2.3%
0.0%
100%

Average
Wage
$31.83
$28.78
$22.34
$32.58
$30.49
$32.85
$30.60

% of Mult Co
workforce**
74.0%
10.5%
4.5%
0.4%
3.4%

114,155

28.8%

$3,145,284

25.9%

$27.55

26.0%

100%

* Estimated as base hourly wage multiplied by total worker hours, as reported on Monthly Employee Utilization
Reports (MEUR) submitted by contractors.
** Authors' analysis of 2013 American Community Survey data for adults in the labor force. Category totals include
individuals identifying in that racial category only, and does not include individuals identifying with more than one
race (3.4% of labor force).
*** Includes workers identifying as a race/ethnicity category other than White-Caucasian.

Table 2b
SWB Hours Worked by Trade and Race/Ethnicity, as of September 2014

Trade
Operator
Pilebuck
Laborer
Flagger
Carpenter
Ironworker
Other Trades
Total
Total, Minus Flaggers

Average
Journey Wage*
$35.10
$34.24
$27.58
$21.32
$31.29
$35.69
$31.82

Total
Hours
101,768
89,647
89,062
32,458
36,680
25,984
21,064
396,663
364,204

POC Hours
11,108
16,234
34,096
24,427
8,639
16,380
3,298
114,181
89,754

POC% of
Trade Hrs
11%
18%
38%
75%
24%
63%
16%
29%
25%

African
American
Hours
597
2,742
7,349
23,154
1,184
54
798
35,878
12,724

Af-Am % of
Trade Hrs
1%
3%
8%
71%
3%
0%
4%
9%
3%

* Calculated as total wages divided by total hours for workers classified as non-apprentice/trainee status.
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Table 2c
Sellwood Bridge Project: Hours Worked by Race/Ethnicity and Apprenticeship Status

Ethnicity
White/Caucasian
African-American
Hispanic
Asian-American
Native American
Unknown
Total, all workers
Total, Persons of Color

Apprenticeship
hours
38,242
4,740
11,260
1,150
1,222
0
56,613
18,371

% of Apprentice
hours
68%
8%
20%
2%
2%
0%
100%
32%

Journey
hours
242,043
31,098
37,183
8,126
18,555
109
337,112
94,961

% of Journey
Hours
72%
9%
11%
2%
6%
0%
100%
28%

Apprentice % of
Total Hours
14%
13%
23%
12%
6%
0%
14%
16%

Table 2d
SWB Apprentice Hours Worked by Trade and Race/Ethnicity, as of September 2014

Trade
Operator
Pilebuck
Laborer
Flagger
Carpenter
Ironworker
Other Trades
Total, all trades

Total
Trade
Hrs
101,768
89,647
89,062
32,458
36,680
25,984
21,064
396,663

Total
Apprentice
Hrs
10,771
15,437
13,179
1,396
6,622
5,025
4,185
56,613

Apprentice
% of Total
Hours
11%
17%
15%
4%
18%
19%
20%
14%

Total POC
Apprentice
Hrs
511
2,832
7,806
1,138
899
4,401
1,607
19,194

POC % of
Trade
Apprentice
Hrs
5%
18%
59%
82%
14%
88%
38%
34%

Af-Amer
Apprent
Hrs
52
513
2,214
1,138
296
0
567
4,780

Af-Am
% of
Apprent Hrs
1%
11%
46%
24%
6%
0%
12%
8%
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Table 2e
SWB Hours Worked by Race/Ethnicity and Owner Race/Ethnicity
Contractor Race/Ethnicity
Worker
Race/Ethnicity
White/Caucasian
Hispanic
African-American
Asian-American
Native American
Total, all workers
Total, workers of
color

White
77%
13%
3%
2%
5%
100%

Hispanic
44%
56%
0%
0%
0%
100%

AfricanAmerican
33%
9%
53%
1%
4%
100%

AsianAmerican
67%
22%
11%
0%
0%
100%

Native
American
77%
10%
1%
7%
6%
100%

All
contractors
71%
12%
9%
2%
5%
100%

Minority
contractors
44%
12%
37%
2%
4%
100%

23%

56%

67%

33%

23%

29%

56%

Table 2f
SWB Hours Worked by Trade and Owner Race/Ethnicity
Contractor Race/Ethnicity

Trade
Operator
Pilebuck
Laborer
Carpenter
Flagger
Ironworker
Other Trades
Total, all trades

White
28%
27%
22%
10%
0%
8%
5%
100%

Hispanic
0%
0%
41%
3%
0%
4%
51%
100%

AfricanAmerican
4%
1%
13%
11%
66%
0%
5%
100%

AsianAmerican
23%
0%
76%
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

Native
American
40%
0%
59%
0%
0%
0%
1%
100%

All
contractors
26%
23%
22%
9%
8%
7%
5%
100%

Minority
contractors
13%
0%
26%
8%
47%
0%
7%
100%
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Table 2g
SWB Worker Hours, Earnings and Workforce Diversity by County, as of September 2014

County/State
Portland Metro Total
-Multnomah County
-Clackamas County
-Clark County WA
-Washington County
-Columbia, Skamania WA, Yamhill
Salem Metro (Marion, Polk)
Other Oregon
Other WA State
All other places
Total, all locations

Total Hours
247,862
95,913
62,188
50,823
25,941
12,997
44,138
50,795
42,950
10,918
396,663

% of Total
Hours
62%
24%
16%
13%
7%
3%
11%
13%
11%
3%
100%

Earnings
$7,275,180
$2,506,483
$1,982,500
$1,605,277
$782,366
$398,554
$1,326,651
$1,672,070
$1,492,867
$370,032
$12,136,801

% of Total
Earnings
60%
21%
16%
13%
6%
3%
11%
14%
12%
3%
100%

POC % of
Total Hours
34%
53%
12%
32%
21%
24%
26%
25%
15%
3%
29%
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